Segurança nacional dos Estados Unidos e as práticas de vigilância das comunicações: análise do caso Carolyn Jewel versus National Security Agency

A ação argumenta no sentido da inconstitucionalidade do programa de vigilância das comunicações conduzido pela National Security Agency (NSA)

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Ericson Scorsim. Advogado e Consultor no Direito da Comunicação. Doutor em Direito pela USP. Autor da Coleção de Ebooks sobre Direito da Comunicação

Em 2008, Carolyn Jewel e outros promoveram ação judicial contra a National Security Agency (NSA), o Presidente dos Estados Unidos, Departamento de Justiça, Advogado Geral dos Estados Unidos, Diretor de Inteligência Nacional, e outros. A ação argumenta no sentido da inconstitucionalidade do programa de vigilância das comunicações conduzido pela National Security Agency (NSA), medidas em relação às comunicações por telefone e internet. O tema envolve questões da interceptação das comunicações em massa realizadas pelo governo norte-americano, bem como o regime de segredo de estado para evitar a divulgação pública deste programa de vigilância, o qual custou aos cofres públicos norte-americanos mais de U$ 100 (cem) milhões de dólares.  O programa foi autorizado por Ordem Presidencial em 2001 pelo governo de George Bush, denominando-se “terrorist surveillance program” (TSP). E, os procedimentos de vigilância foram respaldados pelo Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) com a autorização da Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). Segundo  a ação, o programa de vigilância das comunicações foi realizado através da colaboração de empresas de telecomunicações, como é o caso da AT&T. Os dispositivos de vigilância coletavam o conteúdo de ligações telefônicas, e-mails, mensagens de texto, comunicações pela internet, tanto comunicações domésticas como internacionais. O papel da National Security Agency era o de interceptar o conteúdo das comunicações realizadas através das redes de cabos de telecomunicações da AT&T. Assim, a NSA e a AT&T estabeleceram um programa de colaboração para a interceptação das comunicações domésticas e internacionais, através de redes de cabos de fibra ótica, roteadores, centrais telefônicas, entre outros. Os principais pontos de coleta das comunicações foram estabelecidos nas filiais da AT&T em Atlanta, Bridgeton, Los Angeles, San Diego, San Jose e Seattle. Os autores da ação alegaram a violação à Quarta Emenda da Constituição dos Estados Unidos, o qual garante o direito à inviolabilidade das comunicações e o direito à privacidade, uma vez que os usuários dos serviços de telecomunicações da AT&T foram objeto de interceptações de suas comunicações de modo inconstitucional. Alegaram, ainda, que houve violação ao Foreing Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, o qual proíbe a realização de interceptação das comunicações domésticas, bem como veda a divulgação das comunicações para terceiros. Assim, a AT&T ao divulgar o conteúdo das comunicações para a NSA praticou uma ilegalidade.

Decisão da Justiça da Califórnia: a aplicação do parâmetro da segurança nacional para impedir a divulgação sobre o programa de vigilância governamental dos Estados Unidos

Em 2019, a Corte Distrital da Califórnia decidiu por julgar improcedente a ação.  Segundo a decisão judicial, os autores não provaram os danos e a efetiva prática das interceptações de suas comunicações. Além disto, é aplicável o regime dos segredos de estado, o qual veda a exposição de informações que possam causar danos à segurança nacional. Conforme a decisão a respeito do parâmetro adotado no julgamento: “The same considerations apply with equal force here, where the government has sought to maintain a similarly strategic silence regarding the scope of its bulk collection. In order to issue a dispositive decision on the standing issue, a finding of standing would necessitae disclosure of possible interception of plaintiffs’s communications, thereby signaling injury. Such a disclosure mauy imperil national security. Any attempt to prove the specific facts of the programs at issue, or to defende against the Plaintiff’s analysis of the programs would risk disclosure of the locations, sources, methods, assisting providers, and other operational details of Defendant’s intelligence-gathering activities. At this advanced procedural posture, the Court is bound to accept the Defendants’representation that disclosures of these details reasonably could be expected to cause exceptionally grave damage to national security”. E prossegue a decisão: “Even if, utilizing only public evidence, the Plaintiffs could ostensibly plead sufficient facts to support their claim of standing to pursue their remaining statutory causes of action, the Court finds that it faces the intractable problem that proceeding further with this case would cause exceptionally grave harm to the national security. The Court cannot issue any determinative finding on the issue of whether or not Plaintiffs have standing without taking the risk that such a ruling may result in potentially desvatating nacional security consequences”.  Como se observa, a decisão judicial exige a denominada prova diabólica, isto é, aquela impossível de ter produzida pela defesa.

Participação no caso de amici curiae para defender a tese da proteção aos direitos à privacidade

Na fase de apelação perante da Corte de Apelações do Nono Circuito da Califórnia, diversos amici curiae requereram a participação na ação judicial, por diversas razões.

Primeiro, o Center for Democracy and Technology and New America’s open Technology Institute.[1] Afirmou a importância do tema da vigilância em massa conduzida pelo governo dos Estados Unidos, através da interceptação das comunicações realizadas pela internet e por telefone. E, ainda, a invocação pelo Poder Executivo da doutrina sobre segredos de estado não pode servir para esconder as atividades de vigilância do controle judicial. A Corte Distrital abandonou o controle judicial em nome da segurança nacional. Segundo o governo norte-americano, a divulgação de informações sobre as práticas de interceptação colocariam em risco a segurança nacional dos Estados Unidos.  Segundo a petição: “The district court’s acceptance of that argument is particularly dificult to understand given that it is hardly a secret that governments intercept communications travelling across fiber optic communications cables, in bulk, to support their signal intelligence programs. Governments have acknowledged programs. Many have gone further and have disclosed the methods used in bulk interception. This surveillance – including capabilities, consequences, and proprietary – is openly and in detail discussed in Europe. CDT has recently issued a report that discusses government disclosures concerning bulk cable interception”.

Transparência de governos europeus na divulgação de programas de interceptação das comunicações

Assim, a título ilustrativo, os governos europeus abertamente disponibilizam ao público a suas práticas de interceptação das comunicações por redes de cabos de fibra ótica. A propriedade, comprimento, pontos de conexão dos cabos são informações públicas. E, ainda, conforme a petição: “A single email, constituting multiple packets, may often be sent via different geographic routes, differente cables, differente fibers, and even differente beares within the same fiber. This is one reason why governments like the United Kingdom argue that bulk cable intercetpion is necessary; to maximize the chance of identifying, piecing together and obtaining a sought-after communications”. E, continua: “Governments who conduct bulk cable interception as a form of signals intelligence indicate that they are most easily categorized into two sets; negative filters and positive filters. A negative filter identifies material to immediately discard. An example migh be:  ‘automatically discard all streaming video data identified as Netflix. A positive filter is used to identify material do retain”. Por fim, a petição concluiu que a revelação das informações não é um segredo de Estado, razão pela qual deve ser submetida ao controle judicial.

Abusos na vigilância em massa contra direitos de jornalistas, fontes de informações  e advogados

Por outro lado, o Human Right Watch em sua petição como amicus curiae argumentou sobre os abusos de vigilância em massa conduzida pelo governo dos Estados Unidos. Há especialmente relatos de abusos contra jornalistas e advogados. Razões invocadas para a vigilância em massa referem-se às práticas de contraterrorismo, porém as medidas são utilizadas para colocar como alvos grupos da sociedade civil, advogados de direitos humanos e jornalistas em inúmeros estados. Assim, o governo coloca como suspeitos de atividades terroristas grupos de ativistas de direitos humanos. Conforme a petição inicial: “Some have said that United States surveillance is even worse because of the Government’s immense technical capabilities”. E, ainda: “Human Right Watch internacional work also increases its risk of being surveilled through mass surveillance because the U.S government has jurisdiction over American infrastructure through which foreing data can be routed. Moreover, the Government has shown increased willingness to conduct transnational surveillance. It claims heightened powers to surveil at the border and outside the country, and it shares intelligence with foreign governments”. E, prossegue a petição: “Even entirely foreign communications are subject to American mass surveillance because the United States has jurisdiction over overseas communications made using the services or infrastructure of United States – based companies, such as AT&T. Much of the world’s communications flow through that infrastructure even when users are not based in the United States”. Além disto, há o compartilhamento de inteligência do governo dos Estados Unidos com outros países:
“In addition, the United States and foreign countries share intelligence, including the ‘Five Eyes’ arrangement with the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada e New Zealand and unilateral agreements with countries like Germany, Israel and Saudi Arabia”.  E a capacidade do governo na interceptação das comunicações tem crescido significativamente: “And the government’s surveillance capabilities are constantly growing. Among other things, the NSA  ‘vacuumed up more than 534 million records of phone calls and text messages from American telecommunications providers like AT&T and Verizon last year – more than three times what it collected in 2016”.  Segundo a decisão da Corte Distrital os segredos de estado não podem ser revelados sob o risco à segurança nacional.

Abusos cometidos por outras agências governamentais com a obtenção de informações da NSA

Existem práticas abusivas acontecendo que merecem pronto controle judicial. Por exemplo, agentes do Departamento de Combate ao Tráfico de Drogas utilizam informações obtidas pela NSA; uma prática de “construção paralela” (parallel construction); isto é, uma investigação paralela, mediante a obtenção de provas de modo ilegal. Segundo a petição: “The extensive use of parallel construction to shield surveillance from the judicial system was revealed by  Reuters, which described how the U.S Drug Enforcement Agency’s Special Operations Division distribues tips from overseas NSA intercepts, informats, foreign law enforcement partners and domestic wiretaps to law enforcement officers on the condition that the law enforcement officers not disclose SOD’s involvement”.

Legislação sobre vigilância em massa

Outro amici curiae, American Civil Liberties Union e outros relata o contexto histórico da aprovação da legislação sobre vigilância em massa.[2] Segundo a petição inicial: “Congress enacted FISA in 1978 to govern surveillance conducted for foreign intelligence purpose. It dit so after a congressional committee, led by Senator Frank Church, conducted and in-depth investigation into executive branch surveillance abuses”.  E prossegue a petição: “In response to the Church Committees findings and recommendations for reform, Congress enacted FISA to create a compreehensive statutory scheme to prevent future misuse of electronic surveillance by the executive branch”. Assim, conforme a intenção do legislador, não há o privilégio de segredos de estado em casos envolvendo as atividades de inteligência por vigilância externa. Além disto, o Poder Executivo, ao se apoiar no privilégio de segredo de estado, incorre em inconstitucionalidade ao negar a autoridade do Congresso ao definir a regra da vigilância das comunicações.  Deste modo: “First, Congress has the authority to regulate foreign intelligence surveillance, particularly where, as here, that surveillance implicates U.S persons. Indeed, Congress has regulated the conduct of foreign intelligence surveillance on U.S soil for 40 years through FISA”. Por sua vez, outro ponto destacado pela petição: “Second, Congress has a long-establhished and constitucional role to play in the handling of sensitive and classifed information, and it regulates classified information in several contexts”. Ao final, requerem a revisão da decisão de primeira instância.

O amicus curiae Free Speech Coalition e outros[3] destacaram as características do programa de vigilância governamental dos Estados Unidos: “they operated in dragnet – not targeted – fashion, designed to seize massive amounts of privately owned data; they seized private and personal data about the communications of Americans; they neither sought nor obtained consent from the owners of the data, they were conducted without a judicially issued search warrant, they occurred with no showing of probable cause; and the data seized were then available for search, and searched, by government agencies and by contractors working for government agencies, without notice to the persons whose rights were violated. Em 2014, o governo dos Estados Unidos através do relatório Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) Report confirmou a existência do programa de vigilância eletrônica:  “The private sector provider is compelled to assist the government in acquiring communications across these circuits … Internet transactions are first filtered to eliminate potential domestic transactions, and then are screened to capture only transactions containgin a tasked selector”.  E, ainda, o relatório identifica os tipos de informações coletadas: “The NSA’s acquisition of data occurs ‘with the compelled assistance, of the providers that control the telecommunications backbone over which communications transit”. “Raw upstream collection residess in NSA systems, where it is ‘subject to the NSA’s minimization procedures (the NSA conducts similar upstream collection of ‘telephone communciation’); “The NSA instructs private companies providing the internet background to search  to, from and about, a tasked selector.

Além disto, a petição menciona: “… the NSA’s initial search of all communications is not limited simply to the to and from a communication – which the government has unpersuasibely contended are the equivalent of just looking at the address on a piece of mail, leaving the body of the message intact. PCLOB Report at. 37. On the contrary, the NSA also researches the contents of all communications for what it euphemistically from John Doe or to John Doe, but also communications talk about John Doe. In other words, at NSAs direction, computers are – or at least can be – reading every wordk of every communication. Segundo o governo, a Quarta Emenda da Constituição não é aplicável às comunicações digitais.

Além disto, a petição explica o papel do FBI e da CIA em relação à vigilância eletrônica: “The PCLOB Report denies that the FBI or the CIA have acess to certain raw upstream data that is collected, with the NSA maintain control overt that data. Howewer, for Fourth Amendment purposes, it makes not diffence if the seizure of data and its search is performed by one alphabete agency or another – both are part of the same federal government, all of which is denied the power to do what the government has done”.

E, prossegue a petição: “All of the publicly available information, combined with the fact that the appelants used telecommunications services which were subject to the ‘sharing’ arrangement with the NSA, sufficiently estabalhish that the appelants suffered an injury, namely, a violation of rights protected by the Fourth Amendment”.

Programa de interceptação das comunicações em massa viola a Quarta Emenda da Constituição dos Estados Unidos

O amicus curiae citado narra que a prática interceptação das comunicações através da internet viola a Quarta Emenda, à medida que ofende o direito constitucional à privacidade.  Segundo os autores: “Appellants rely on two recent U.S Supreme Court opinions striking down government intrusions upon internet communications, which that Court found had unconstitutionally invaded Fourth Amendment ‘protected privacy interests in Internet browsing (.), explaining how the breadth and depth of person’s digital information gives a wide-ranging picture of a person’s most private thoughts and actions – even beyond what a general search of their home might reveal”. E, ainda: “But personal privacy interests are not the only basis of Appellant’s Fourth Amendment claims. Appelants have also asserted a violation of their Fourth Amendment-protected property rights – which they describe specifically as being as ‘possessory’ right in their internet communications while in transit”. Adicionalmente, há o direito de propriedade sobre as comunicações pela internet: “There should be no question that there is a Fourth Amendment property interest in Internet communications. In Riley v. California, the Supreme Court recognized the significand Fourth Amendment interests in digital information carried by nearly every American in their cell phones. The Court described both the quantity of information available in the storage of cell phones (a cell phone search would typically expose to the government far more than the most exhaustive search of a house) as well as the quality of that information”. Também, a petição destaca a questão dos aparelhos celulares e a relação com o armazenamento de dados em nuvem: “Riley also recognized the increasing reliance by mobile devices (and many other devices) on ‘cloud computing, which the Court described in an overly simplistic fashion as ‘the capacity of internet-connected devices to display data stored on remote servers rather than on the device itsel. Cloud computing and storage relied on by ever-present mobile devices raises the obvious threat that the information in a cell phone that the Court recognized as protected in Riley is being routinely violated by the upstream surveillance which intercepts the contents of cloud-store, privately owned information”. Igualmente, a petição  explica a razão para a proteção das pessoas contra buscas de informações arbitrárias sem ordens judiciais: “If the Fourth Amendment was designed to prevent government’s use of ‘general warrants’to search of seditious publications’ it should also prevent the governments’s completely unauthorized searches and seizures of data looking for modern actions of sedition not even with patina of legitimacy provided by a general warrrant.[4] To the extent that the NSA has designed to explain its activities to the American people whow it surveills, the NSA’s upstream data collection program is designed to deter, prevent, or punish acts of violence against the government and the public peace – which constitute acts of sedition”. Por fim, os autores afirmam: “The ‘national security’ defense which was offered by the government to provide cover to general warrants, and passively accepted by the district court, provides no excuse for unconstitutional actw whatsoever. The extensiva showing by the appellants as to how the searches and seizures have been occuring for nearly two decades was dismissed as much ado about nothing. The district court did not even consider appelants evidence sufficiente to create a presumption or at least shift the burden of going forward to the appellees – to explain exactly why it had created secret government offices (SG3 rooms) within telecommunications facilities, and why it insatlled peering links onto fiber-optic cables to copy internet traffic, it not to spy on the communications of American citizens and other”.

Da necessidade de proteção à confidencialidade e segurança das comunicações

O amicus curiae The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press[5] destaca a importância da confidencialidade e segurança das comunicações. Assim, quando há ameaça de vigilância em massa das fontes de informação há o risco de silenciamento.  Há a proteção legal à proteção do sigilo das fontes de informações. Conforme a petição inicial: “The goverment’s mass surveillance at issue compromisses the ability of the new media to ensure the confidentiality and anonymity of their sources. It therefore threatens the integrity of newsgathering and the ability of the press to provide unavarnished reporting on both the government and private sector. Legislatures and courts across the country have repeatelly affirmed the importance of an independ press in the promotion of an informed electorate”.  Assim, os sistemas de vigilância em massa colocam em risco a integridade das comunicações: “This trend has heightened anxiety among reporters and news organizations over the integrity of their communications with confidential sources, and has deterred sources and potential whistleblowers from coming forward”. E, ainda, há o potencial criminalização dos jornalistas e fontes de informações diante do vazamento de informações: “While Espionage Act leak investigations are criminal, and are pursued using criminal investigative tools, information gathered in the course of the surveillance programs challenged here could still figure in criminal leak investigations”. E no caso o FBI é agência federal responsável pelas investigações de vazamento de informações. Segundo a petição: “That information will then be included in the FBI’Ss Data Integration and Visualization Systems, or DIVS search which permits one search term to acess multiple FBI databasees. A DIVS search is one of the first investigative steps the FBI will conduct at the assessment stage of a matter”.  Além disto, defende-se a utilização de outros métodos de investigação menos invasivos do que a interceptação das comunicações. O Stored Communciations Act distingue entre conteúdos dos metadados. Ademais, conforme a petição: “To be clear, amicus believes that the indiscriminate collection of metadata harms reporter-source relationships and the newsgathering process, and it may do so to a greater degree that content collection in some cases. Content can be coded or encrypted, but metadata is harder to obscure”.  E mais: “Nonethelless, the additional protections that legislators have given to the substantive content of electronic communications only showcases the importance of protections for reporter-source confidentiality in this case, and communications content will often include journalist work product material, which, as discussed above, has received special protections under the laws of most states and through federal legislation such as Privacy Protection Act”. Alem disto, há o reconhecimento do direito à privacidade sobre o conteúdo das comunicações: “The Supreme Court has similarly recognized, as early as 1878, an elevated privacy right in the content of communications”. E, ainda:  “The content of communications receives this special protection because it contains an individual’s  ‘innermost thoughts. E ainda; “finding that ‘a suscriber enjoys a reasonable expectation of privacy  in the contents of emails and requiring a Fourth Amendment probable cause warrant to comple the production of the content of emails. Por fim concluiu: “Thus, as the Privacy and Civil Liberties oversight Board recognized, mass surveillance programs that permit the collection of communications metadata and content present ‘serious repercussions today for the freedom of the press’ as they sweep up journalista work product in addition to reporter-source communnications”.  Ademais, a vigilância em assa nega a proteção legal à confidencialidade das fontes e a liberdade de imprensa.

O Privacy and Civil Liberties Overship Board, no relatório denominado Report on the Government’s Use of the Call Detail Records Program Under the USA Freedom Act, órgão responsável por fiscalizar o programa de vigilância em massa da NSA destaca alguns problemas quanto à integridade dos dados coletados pela agência federal.[6]  Em especial, aponta os limites à retenção dos dados coletados pela NSA. Também, indica a potencial violação aos direitos de privacidade, mediante a obtenção de dados de geolocalização. Além disto,  explica a necessidade de  serem adotadas novas medidas em proteção à privacidade.  Segundo o relatório: “To be sure, law is essential to ensuring that the government does not overreach and that our national security apparaturs remains democratically accountable to the people. Yet explicit and detailed codification of intelligence practices carries risk to both operations and privacy. It carries operational risk when it is unduluy rigid, given the ever-changing threats our country faces. And it carries risk to our civil liberties when it serves as a continued source of positive authority even as technology evolves. Some of the laws governing acess to electronic communications that precede the commercial internet (not to mention the smarphone) exemplify the risks”.

E prossegue o relatório explicando a dinâmica das práticas da NSA: “The impact on intelligence and privacy of the changes wrought by the USA Freedom Act is particularly dificult to assess. For example, under the bulk collection program NSA approved only about 300 query terms in 2012. Yet under the USA Freedom Act, which prohibited bulk collection of call detail records. 164.682 US person query terms were run against NSA’S data last year alone, perhaps in part because queries no longer required pre-approval either from designed agency officials or form the FISA court. At the same time, the number of intelligence reports dropped precipitously from one program to the next. In the three-year periodo between 2006 and 2009, NSA issued 277 intelligence reports – more than ten times the number produced during the life of the NSA Freedom Act CDR program. It’s not immediately obvious to us how to compare bulk collection witch limited querying against more limited collection with more extensive querying; we also do not know if the drop in reports was due largely to changes in technology. At a minimum, thought, it strikes us that a case can be made that the USA Freedom Act rendered the collection of CDRs less operationally valuable while augmenting the very privacy concerns it sought to lessen”. E, ainda, adiciona o relatório:  “The threats we face not abated and technology continues to evolve. We encourage legislators to work with the executive branch as well as tecnology experts to understand any gaps in current authorities and how tecnology may be leveraged to better protect privacy while respecting national security imperatives. To retain operations value over time, new communications surveillance authorities should be technologically neutral, allowing the governments’s implementation – both in gathering intelligence and in protecting civil liberties – to evolve alongside technology and the manner in which our adversaries plot and threaten our National. We look forward to working with Congress on these issues”.

Métodos de Coleta de Sinais de Inteligência através de redes de cabos de fibra ótica terrestres e submarinos

Em relação às técnicas de inteligência para interceptação das comunicações adotadas pelos governos, especialmente das redes de cabos submarinos, há métodos de coleta de sinais de inteligência. Há as atividades de extração, filtragem, armazenamento, análise e disseminação dos dados.[7] Destaque-se que a rede global de internet é constituída por uma rede de cabos submarinos que interligam os continentes: Américas, Europa, África, Asia e Oceania. A interceptação das comunicações diretamente nas redes de cabos terrestres e submarinos é realizada, para além dos Estados Unidos, pelos serviços de inteligência e militares do Reino Unido[8], Suécia[9], Alemanha[10],  Holanda[11],  Finlândia[12], França[13], Canadá, Noruega[14], África do Sul, entre outros.

Em síntese, o caso Carolyn Jewel versus National Security Agency, por ora pendente de julgamento de segunda instância na Justiça dos Estados Unidos,  apresenta questões relevantíssima sobre o tema da coleta de dados e interceptação de comunicações, sob o fundamento da segurança, especialmente sobre os riscos à confidencialidade das comunicações.

[1] Brief of Center for Democracy and Technology and New America’s Open Technology Institute as Amici Curiae in support of plaintifss-Appelants and in support of reversal. On appeal from the United States District Court of the Northern District of California., 13.09.2019.

[2] Brief of Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union. On appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. Case n. 08.04373.

[3] Brief Amicus Curiae of Free Speech Coalition e outros. On appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. September, 13, 2019.

[4]  Conforme a petição: “Sedition in that era was described as “factious commotion of the people a tumultuous assembly of men rising in opposition to law or the administration of justice, and in disturbance of public peace”. Webter/s Dictionarry of the English Language.

[5] Brief of amicus curiae the Reporters Committeee for freedom of the Press in support of plaintiffs-appleants urging reversal. On appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Cailifornia, 13/09/2019.

[6] Privacy and Civil Liberties Overship Board. Report on the Governments Use of the Call Detail Records Program Under the USA Freedom Act. Working to ensure that efforts by the Executive Branch to protect the nation from terrorism appropriately safeguard privacy and civil liberties, february, 2020.

[7] Not a Secret: Bulk interception practices of intelligence agencies. As european governments openly discuss bulk cable interception. The U.S Remains unnessarily secretive. Centre for Democracy & Technology, september, 2019.

[8] Investigatory Power Act of 2016. Agência: GCHQ.

[9] Signals Intelligence Act 2008.

[10]  German Federal Intelligence Service (BND). Segundo o autor Eric Kind: “There was a significatn scandal in Germany regarding the deployment of NSA selectors on BND systems, and the subsequent sharing of intercepted material back to NSA once collected. The NSA selectors were never publicly disclosed, despirte multiple legal cases brought seeking to disclose them. The German parliament sued the German government for refusing to provide the NSA selectors to the Committee of Inquiry which was set up to investigate mass surveillance and the implications of the Snowden revelations. The G10 Committee which approves and reviews actions taken under the G10 Act also sued the government to gain acess to NSA sectors but was also unsucessful”. Not

[11] Intelligence and Security Services Act of 2017, Agências federais: General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) e Military Intelligence and Security Service (CCM).  As agências possuem poderes para interceptar comunicações de satélites.

[12] Civilian Intelligence Act and Military Intelligence Act.

[13] French Intelligence Act 2015.

[14] Intelligence Service Act.

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